The question of whether war spending is a necessary evil keeps coming up in contemporary societies, whether it is during budget season, in response to terrorist threats, or when leaders want to demonstrate their military might. Governments keep spending enormous sums of money on defense, which is strikingly similar to how some people view painkillers—not ideal, but effective in the short term. According to philosopher A. C. Grayling, whose thoughts on war have upended traditional wisdom, this practice might have more to do with deeply rooted customs than with necessity.
Grayling’s point of view is very obvious: societies are set up to accept—even anticipate—war. He offers a sobering realization by looking at the recurrent cycles of armed conflict from a historical and moral perspective: war is something we prepare for methodically and predictably, rather than something that just happens. Institutions creating the framework for future violence are more of a problem than violent instincts.
When governments spend billions on defense research, militarized borders, and weapon systems, they are effectively guaranteeing the continuation of war infrastructure. As advocates often point out, incredibly flexible technologies created under the pretense of “defense” frequently find their way into civilian applications. Some examples of dual-purpose advancement include the internet, GPS, and trauma medicine, all of which have their roots in military innovation. These examples, which are frequently used to justify enormous defense spending, are noticeably better versions of applications from the peacetime period.
| Name | A. C. Grayling |
|---|---|
| Profession | Philosopher, Author |
| Nationality | British |
| Known For | Ethical philosophy, writing on war and peace |
| Notable Work | War: An Enquiry (Yale University Press) |
| Institutional Role | Founder of New College of the Humanities |
| Affiliation | University of London |
| Public Position | Believes war is sometimes a necessary evil, but societies must resist normalizing it |
| Key Argument | War is enabled by social and political structures, not just human nature |
| Ethical Focus | Intersection of just war theory and humanitarian law |
| Reference Link | America Magazine – A Necessary Evil? |
However, the ethical cost is frequently omitted from this discussion. Economic models rarely account for the traumas, displacements, and deaths that occur. A missile factory might create jobs, but the product it produces is meant to destroy. Grayling urges “aversion therapy of truth,” a potent phrase that demands we face the unvarnished aftermath of war: bloodied streets, orphaned children, and distraught mothers. These are realities concealed behind sterile terms like “collateral damage” and “strategic necessity,” not abstract concepts.
Defense contractors have established a strong presence in legislative processes through strategic positioning. They maintain their relevance year after year by lobbying for funding and positioning their services as national priorities. Defense budgets comparable to those of entire nations are drawn to firms like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and even more recent ones involved with AI and cybersecurity. Their impact is especially noticeable in times of crisis, when funding spikes quickly follow and fear turns into a currency.
The emergence of autonomous weapons systems, known as LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems), has given this discussion a frightening new angle in recent years. These weapons use artificial intelligence to lessen the role of humans in making deadly decisions. The question of whether a machine can be trusted to recognize surrender is a particularly novel yet profoundly unsettling ethical conundrum. Can proportionality be weighed? Grayling’s caution is pertinent and well-founded: automating war runs the risk of completely removing accountability.
Though there are some exceptions, celebrities have generally kept quiet. Mark Ruffalo and Roger Waters have long expressed opposition to the military. Their criticism draws attention to the deafening silence of other powerful people who indirectly profit from defense contracts and patriotic branding, particularly in the tech and entertainment sectors. Whether deliberate or not, the public’s belief that military might equates to moral superiority is strengthened by this silence.
The way that war is ingrained in national identity is demonstrated by public holidays such as Memorial Day in the United States. These days, fast food specials, sports tributes, and flag-waving promotions are frequently used in place of mourning. As Grayling points out, the commercialization of sacrifice turns war into a consumerist ritual with background music. This cultural choreography makes war spending politically secure and emotionally acceptable.
Defense budgets are frequently supported economically by the immediate advantages they provide, such as industrial stimulus, job creation, and regional development. However, this reasoning is dangerously biased. A report from Foreign Policy in Focus claims that investments in peace-oriented sectors like public health, education, and renewable energy yield noticeably higher employment and quality of life returns. Particularly in nations with deteriorating infrastructure and growing inequality, the opportunity cost is enormous.
Politicians frequently neglect diplomacy in favor of deterrence. Initiatives for peace are infamously underfunded and viewed as optional rather than necessary. A risky cycle is fueled by this imbalance: war breaks out, military spending rises, and diplomatic ties deteriorate. The reason the UN and other international organizations are weak is because military programs receive far more funding and support than they do.
Grayling makes a particularly strong case—supported by historical evidence—that war is frequently planned rather than inevitable. He looks at how economic policies and social contracts ingrain militarism into the fabric of a country, resulting in a self-reinforcing system that not only increases the likelihood of war but also makes it convenient. Even educational systems normalize conflict rather than confront it through patriotic storytelling and sanitized history curricula.
This model is especially harmful for fragile states or early democracies. Leaders may use military spending as a means of power consolidation, unity, or distraction when their legitimacy is shaky. Civil society suffers as a result; opposition is branded as unpatriotic, dissent is criminalized, and rights are restricted. War spending frequently tilts the balance in favor of dialogue rather than repression, which is what a healthy democracy is all about.
However, some countries have very good substitutes. Nordic nations like Sweden and Norway make significant investments in renewable development, education, and mediation. Despite having modest military budgets, they continue to have high security indices. This is strategic, not utopian. They provide a useful refutation of the necessary evil argument by emphasizing stability via social cohesiveness as opposed to force.
His message has become especially pertinent in an era of hybrid conflict—cyberattacks, proxy wars, and economic coercion—since the publication of Grayling’s War: An Enquiry. Although they don’t call for tanks or missiles, these conflicts are just as dangerous as conventional ones. As a result, the argument for continuously raising traditional military budgets is becoming less and less persuasive.
Societies will have to decide in the upcoming years whether to invest in militarized economies or in long-term peacebuilding. There is no utopian pacifism implied by Grayling. Rather, he advocates for strategic diplomatic investment, realistic restraint, and a refusal to romanticize destruction. Even though war is occasionally inevitable, every national budget does not need to practice it daily.
The ultimate verdict is about accountability, not idealism. War spending must be supported by accountability, transparency, and quantifiable necessity rather than by fear or legacy if it is to continue to be a part of national strategy. Only then can we frank question whether spending on war is a necessary evil or just a costly habit we’ve been too scared to break.
